No Objection To Declassification 2009/10/01 : LOC-HAK-8-1-6-5

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

Harold H. Saunders

SUBJECT: Memo from Mr. Helms on Iran

Mahering This

SEP

Dick Helms has sent you the attached memo

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Essentially Ambassador MacArthur has

concern that certain bureaucratic turnings in Washington might undercut what the Shah believes is a commitment by the

President to provide a substantial number of F4 and Cl30 aircraft.

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that the Defense Department has asked the intelligence community to do a SNIE on the military threat to Iran. This is somewhat like the Arab-Israeli situation in that the visible threat is probably not great enough to justify as much hardware as the Shah wants. However, the Shah is building not just a military establishment suited to the threat, but a deterrent as well.

An effort is already being made to broaden the framework of the SNIE so that it will not turn out to be so limited as to make it more difficult for us to operate from a broader view of the situation. However, the SNIE by itself obviously will not make policies. The decision on the number of planes to be sold will be made over the next couple of months, and we will have a crack at it in the normal bureaucratic machinery. Essentially, this decision will be made with the President's general commitment in mind, although not perhaps without some argument.

In passing on the attached memo, therefore, I simply want to reassure you that I am on top of this problem and will continue to work -- along with Joe Sisco -- to make sure that the President's general promise is not undercut.

OSD review completed

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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The broader problem with Iran, of course, is that as long as the military credit program is held up we will not have the assistance of Iran that will permit it to proceed with financial confidence.

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